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The Japanese economy’s average annual real growth rate was only 0.8 per-
cent from 1991 to 2001. Reﬂecting the weak economy, Japan has not been
able to restore stability in its ﬁnancial sector even though more than a
decade has passed since the 1980s bubble. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has
had a zero nominal interest rate policy most of the time since February
1999, but it has been ineﬀective because of deﬂation. By the end of 2001,
the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂator was about 7 percent below its
1994 peak when adjusted for the 1997 consumption tax hike. The index was
falling at annual rate of 1.5 percent at the end of 2001. Given the estimated
6 percent deﬂationary GDP gap and the near-zero real growth in 2002, de-
ﬂation is likely to accelerate to more than 2.0 percent by early 2003 (see
Japan Center for Economic Research [JCER] 2002, chapter 1).
In this chapter, I show that Japan will not be able to have a viable bank-
ing sector without stopping deﬂation. The banking industry has not shown
a proﬁt since ﬁscal 1993 (ended March 1994) if one excludes capital gains
from stock and real estate portfolios. Interest margins have been too low to
cover the increase in loan losses brought about by the weak economy.
Banks cannot raise margins for several reasons: competition with subsi-
dized government-sponsored ﬁnancial institutions (GFIs); intense politi-
cal pressure, backed by the Financial Services Agency (FSA), to make new
loans to small and medium companies; and deﬂation-weakened borrowers.
I expect that the Japanese government will have to nationalize most of the
banking sector by 2005. Capital injections will not solve the problems.
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ference participants for valuable comments on an earlier draft.Established Japanese life insurance companies also face a serious situa-
tion. In the 1980s and early 1990s they promised high minimum yields on
long-term contracts. For whatever reason, the companies did not match
these long-term liabilities with long-term ﬁxed-income investments. Under
the BOJ zero-interest rate policy, insurers thus are suﬀering large negative
carry. (“Carry” is the industry term for the diﬀerence between a product’s
income and its associated costs).
A complicating factor in this dire picture is banks and life insurance
companies providing each other capital—a practice called double-
gearing. Weakened banks ask insurance companies to provide equity cap-
ital and subordinated loans. In return, the mutual life insurers ask banks to
subscribe their surplus notes (similar to nonvoting redeemable preferred
shares) and subordinated debt. When Chiyoda Life failed in October 2000,
Tokai Bank lost ¥74 billion. The FSA actively encourages this dangerous
practice. Thus, Shokichi Takagi, director of FSA’s Supervision Depart-
ment, has publicly stated that double-gearing among ﬁnancial institutions
is highly beneﬁcial to enhance public conﬁdence (“Under-Capitalized
Banks Are Not Likely Even after Special Examinations: Interview with
Mr. Takagi, Head of Supervision Dept. of FSA,” Nihon Keizai Shinbun,27
November 2001, p. 7).
The life insurers’ problem is easier to solve than the banks’ problem. Us-
ing a reorganization procedure, life insurance companies can fail and cut
promised interest rates on their policies. On the other hand, bank runs
would ensue if the government did not fully pay the depositors of a failed
large bank because a large part of the banking sector is either insolvent or
very nearly so. In such a situation, the government would have to bear the
full brunt of defaulting loans at a time when its own debt to GDP ratio is
rising by 10 percentage points a year. If things continue as they are, the
Japanese government is unlikely to maintain investment-grade credit rat-
ings on its bonds.
The chapter continues with an analysis of banks’ bad loans and their un-
derreserving for them. The deteriorating condition of banks is then con-
sidered, and the causes of bank unproﬁtability examined. As part of this,
the eﬀects of deregulation and the role of government-sponsored ﬁnancial
institutions is considered. Turning to life insurance companies, their prob-
lems and weak supervision are discussed. The risks of the banks and in-
surers engaging in double-gearing is then analyzed.
1.1 Banks’ Bad Loans
Table 1.1 and table 1.2 show data on problem loans of Japanese banks.
Japanese banks have acknowledged ¥82 trillion in losses from bad loans for















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)have more than ¥42 trillion of disclosed bad loans, about 8 percent of their
loan portfolios.
I am one of the many who feel the disclosed ﬁgures understate the real
situation. The FSA collects data on “classiﬁed loans,” a broader concept of
problem loans, but does not disclose it for individual banks. Under the
FSA’s Bank Examination Manual, banks are required to rate their loans,
taking account of default risk and quality of collateral. There are four
grades: normal, substandard, doubtful, and estimated-loss loans. The last
three are considered classiﬁed loans. Banks then estimate their loan-loss
reserves and the amount of write-oﬀs. Because of the broader deﬁnition,
the amount of classiﬁed loans is more than twice that of disclosed bad
loans. Total classiﬁed loans for all banks was ¥71.1 trillion in March 2002.
1.1.1 Underreserving
Total loan loss reserves of Japanese banks have been low relative to those
of U.S. banks. While U.S. bad loans declined from 3 percent of total loans
in 1992 to 1 percent in 1999, the Japanese ratio rose from 2 percent to 6 per-
cent (ﬁg. 1.1). Loan-loss reserves in the United States have been above 160
percent of bad loans since 1994, while in Japan they have been in the 40
percent to 60 percent range (ﬁg. 1.2). We can clearly see that although the
U.S. banking sector recovered quickly from its bad-loan problems in early
1990s, the Japanese situation has been deteriorating even with the 1999
capital injection by the government.
Many analysts of Japanese banks suspect that the banks are not record-
ing enough loan-loss reserves. This problem is exacerbated by the lenient
reserving policy stipulated by the FSA Bank Examination Manual. Japan-
ese banks usually calculate loan-loss reserves by dividing their loans into
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Table 1.2 Analysis of Japanese Bank Loans, 1997–2002 (¥ billions)
1997a 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Normal loans 550,000 544,814 487,500 472,388 470,669 490,537
Classiﬁed loans total 76,700 71,700 64,258 63,386 65,671 71,087
Substandard 65,300 65,500 61,024 60,539 63,118 67,787
Doubtful 8,700 6,100 3,160 2,835 2,553 3,300
Estimated loss 2,700 100 74 12 0 0
Required reservesb C 27,350 22,918 19,366 18,828 19,117 20,273
Actual reserves D 12,334 17,815 14,797 12,230 11,555 13,353
Underreserved (C – D) 15,016 5,103 4,569 6,592 7,562 6,920
Source: Data are available from the Financial Services Agency web site (http://www.fsa.go.jp).
Notes: Data are for ﬁscal years ending in March of year shown.
aClassiﬁed loan data are based on Ministry of Finance announcements.
bAuthor’s estimates based on 1 percent of normal loans plus 20 percent of substandard loans plus 70 per-
cent of doubtful loans plus 100 percent of estimated loss loans.the FSA-mandated categories, then estimated losses for each group using
the following time horizons.
1. Normal loans and substandard loans without arrears or reduced in-
terest rates: expected one-year loss rate.
2. Substandard loans with arrears or reduced interest rates and doubt-
ful loans: expected three-year loan loss rate.
Most loans are routinely rolled over, so the one-year ﬁgures understate the
net present value of future losses over the true life of the loans in category
1. Thus, instead of a one-year rate, banks should reserve using, as a mini-
mum, the three-year cumulative rate for all substandard loans.
To estimate more appropriate reserve ﬁgures, I have estimated required
loan loss reserves based on FSA data of classiﬁed loans. A Bank of Japan
(1997) sample study looked at the actual subsequent loan losses of eight-
een banks for each category of classiﬁed loans on their ﬁscal 1993 reports
(table 1.3). At the end of three years (in March 1997) about 17 percent of
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Fig. 1.1 Comparison of the bad loan situation in Japan and the United States
Source: JCER (2001b).
Notes: Japan: ﬁscal year; United States: calendar year. Figures after ﬁscal year 1997 do not
include data of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa
Bank, Fukutoku Bank, and Midori Bank. Japanese bad loan ratio   Risk control loans/to-
tal loans; U.S. bad loan ratio   (loans with arrears for more than 90 days   loans that do not
count accrued interest rates as asset   restructured loans)/total loans.substandard loans and over 75 percent of doubtful loans had been lost and
almost 100 percent of estimated loss loans.
These ﬁgures indicate that banks should keep larger loan loss reserves. I
have calculated estimated reserves requirements based on 20 percent of
substandard loans, 70 percent of doubtful loans, and 1 percent of normal
loans. This last is because of the migration of normal loans to classiﬁed
loans. The results are in table 1.2, row C.
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Fig. 1.2 Comparison of the Loan loss provisioning in Japan and the United States
Source: JCER (2001b).
Notes: See ﬁgure 1.1 notes.
Table 1.3 Cumulative Loss Rate
Classiﬁcation of Loan in March 1994 (%)
Number of Years after Classiﬁcation Substandard Doubtful
March 1995 1 1.7 27.4
March 1996 2 9.8 52.1
March 1997 3 16.7 75.3
Source: BOJ (1997).
Notes:Percentage of loans in the classiﬁcation in March 1994 that had been written oﬀ at the
end of each time period. Data are for an eighteen-bank sample.By comparing rows C and D, we can estimate the lower bound of under-
reserving (row C minus row D). Although substantially below the esti-
mated 1997 level, underreserving remains large.
1.2 The Banks’ Deteriorating Condition
Figure 1.3 provides further evidence of the deteriorating condition of
banks. Although the bad-loan to total-loan ratio has stabilized for city
banks, for ﬁrst- and second-tier regional banks it has been increasing rap-
idly. The large 1995 increase for regional banks in part reﬂects changes in
disclosure requirements, but the trend since is due primarily to deteriorat-
ing loan quality.
Corresponding to the ﬂow (proﬁt) ﬁgures, the capital position of Japan-
ese banks has been deteriorating. Under Japanese accounting rules for
banks and lenient application by the regulators, Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) capital ratios have been manipulated in many ways.
First, banks have underreserved against bad loans, as explained above.
This tends to increase bank core capital by the same amount.
Second, banks have large deferred-tax assets on their balance sheets
even though they have been losing money continually since 1993 and loss
carry-forwards are limited to ﬁve years. There is little prospect of utilizing
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Fig. 1.3 Japanese banks’ bad loan–total loan ratios
Source: JCER (2001b).the deferred-tax asset by showing genuine proﬁt in the near future, so it
should be written oﬀ.
Third, most of banks’ subordinated loans are held by friendly life insur-
ance companies. The banks, in turn, hold subordinated loans and surplus
notes of the life companies. This is double-gearing and the cross-held quasi
capital should not be treated as genuine capital for either the banks or the
life insurance companies.
Table 1.4shows core (tier 1) capital adjusted for unrealized capital gains,
underreserving, and deferred taxes for major Japanese banks since March
1998. On this calculation, eight banks had negative equity in 1998, but only
two were nationalized. The capital ratio recovered in ﬁscal 1998, part due
to the ¥6.2 trillion in capital injected by the government, and rose further
as stock prices recovered. But it began deteriorating again in 2000, the re-
sult of more loans going bad and stock prices falling. In September 2001
was at 0.86 percent, below where it had been three years earlier.
The capital position of banks is quite sensitive to stock prices. Table 1.5
shows the capital structure of all commercial banks. Core capital based on
traditional historical cost accounting is adjusted for unrealized capital gains
on stocks, deferred taxes, the public capital injection, and underreserving
for loan losses. Although banks show ¥29.3 trillion of capital on their bal-
ance sheet at the end of March 2002, this ﬁgure is inﬂated with ¥10.7 trillion
of deferred-tax assets (present value of the future tax shelter), ¥6.9 trillion
of underreserving, and ¥7.2 trillion of government capital. Removing these
amounts, the privately held equity of the banking sector is only ¥4.5 trillion.
This is very small compared to their ¥71.8 trillion of problem loans.
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Table 1.4 Distribution of Adjusted Capital-Asset Ratios of Major Banks
Level of Adjusted 1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001
Capital as % Assetsa Mar Mar Mar Sep Mar Sep
Less than –2% 200011
–2 to less than 0% 620003
Subtotal, insolvent 820014
0% to less than 2% 8 10458 1 1
2% to less than 4% 3 5 9 10 6 0
4% to less than 6% 004000
Total number of banks 19 17 17 15 15 15
Weighted average % 0.93 2.07 3.48 2.36 1.83 0.86
Source: Updated by the author from JCER (2001).
Notes: Last day of months shown. Fiscal 1997 ended 31 March 1998, and so forth.
aAdjusted capital is deﬁned as core capital plus unrealized capital gains and losses plus loan
loss reserves minus estimated loan losses minus deferred tax asset. As in table 1.2, estimated
loan losses are deﬁned as 1 percent of normal loans plus 20 percent of substandard loans plus
70 percent of doubtful loans plus 100 percent of estimated loss loans. Individual banks do not




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Because the ¥34.4 trillion market value of stocks held by banks is about
7.5 times their net capital, a 10 percent fall in the stock price index wipes
out about 76 percent of their net capital. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
unrealized capital gains (the diﬀerence between columns [1] and [2]) was
very large and banks could withstand ﬂuctuations in stock prices. How-
ever, in the 1990s, banks sold stock to realize gains to oﬀset huge loan
losses. The increase in book value of shares (column [2]) during the 1990s
shows the banks were buying back most of the stock they sold.
1.2.1 An Unproﬁtable Business
Banking in Japan has become an unproﬁtable, structurally depressed in-
dustry. Excluding capital gains realized by selling shares and real estate,
Japan’s banks as a group have been in the red since the year ended March
1994 (ﬁscal 1993). The primary cause of this is low interest rates, which are
squeezing proﬁts.
Let us look at the proﬁt structure of banks nationwide. Table 1.6 shows
the proﬁt-loss accounts of all commercial banks. In the nine years from ﬁs-
cal 1992 to ﬁscal 2000, banks made around ¥10 trillion each year as lend-
ing margin (row A, deﬁned as interest and dividends earned minus interest
paid). Revenue from such sources as bond and currency dealing and ser-
vice charges were over ¥2 trillion, and ¥3 trillion more recently (row B).
This includes all other revenue except capital gains realized on stocks and
real estate. Revenues from banks’ principal operations therefore amount
to roughly ¥12 trillion to ¥13 trillion yen a year (row A   row B).
Total costs—including personnel and other operating expenses—were
over ¥7 trillion (row C). Operating costs declined during 1998–2000 be-
cause of cost-cutting measures. It is likely to be diﬃcult to continue that
pace of cost cutting. Certainly, the banks may cut labor costs further by re-
ducing employment and cutting average compensation. But the banks
have to invest heavily in information technology to remain competitive.
In the 1990s the banks stinted on improving systems because of preoc-
cupation with bad-loan problems, and now they have poor quality com-
puter systems. Thus, for example, the zengin electronic fund transfer sys-
tem, which is the main payment system among bank customers, cannot
handle two-byte codes, so it cannot send customer names and messages in
kanji (characters). As a result, more and more payments (especially utility
bills) are handled by convenience store chains, which have installed so-
phisticated terminals.
Since the early 1990s more and more loans held by banks have turned
into nonperforming assets. Banks have suﬀered over ¥6 trillion in loan
losses each year since ﬁscal 1994, and ¥9 trillion in the last year (row E). As
a result, banks have not reported positive net operating proﬁt since ﬁscal

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.on stocks and real estate (row G), banks have shown a positive bottom line
(row F   row G).
1.3 Causes of Bank Unproﬁtability
The proﬁt margin of Japanese banks is too small to cover the increase in
default risk since the bubble burst. Two principal elements of this—the
deregulation that has been going on since the 1980s and competition from
government-sponsored ﬁnancial institutions—are taken up in the follow-
ing sections.
The nature of government regulation is a third factor. Thus, under the
terms and condition of the government capital injection in March 1999,
banks are legally required to maintain and increase loans to small and
medium ﬁrms. Shinsei Bank, which reduced loans to such ﬁrms, was or-
dered by the FSA to increase its lending. Under these conditions, banks of-
ten disregard their procedures to make new loans to small companies, at
ultimate cost to the banks and the economy as a whole because of the mis-
allocation of resources.
1.3.1 Eﬀects of Deregulation
The average lending rate of Japanese banks was 1.8 percent in ﬁscal
2000, while the average funding cost was 0.3 percent and the average inter-
mediation cost was 1.2 percent. Thus, the gross spread was only 0.35 per-
cent (Japanese Bankers Association 2001). The average credit rating of
borrowers from banks is about BB, the annual loan loss rate is well over 1
percent, which means a negative margin of 0.65 percent. Part of this is
oﬀset by fees from borrowers and other customers, but a key fact is that the
banks are making losses from lending.
One of the reasons for the small gross spread is the overhang of deposit
interest rate controls until the early 1990s. When the government con-
trolled deposit rates, banks easily made money taking deposits. This is seen
in ﬁgure 1.4.
Figure 1.4 decomposes the lending margin (interest earned minus inter-
est paid) into regulatory rent and the true proﬁt margin (the spread be-
tween the average lending rate and the market rate). The regulatory rent is
taken as the diﬀerence between the banks’ funding cost and the risk-free
short-term money market rate. Notice that the true lending margin in
much of the 1980s was negative, which suggests banks passed part of the
rent on to borrowers.
As deposit-rate controls were phased out in the late 1980s and early
1990s, banks tried to keep up proﬁt margins by increasing lending rates rel-
ative to short-term market rates.
Although the banks have not raised their proﬁt margin, borrowers are




































































































































































































































































































































.shows movements of the average new lending rate, overnight call rate, and
the implied ex post real interest rates computed by subtracted the GDP de-
ﬂator inﬂation rate. Reﬂecting the BOJ’s loose monetary policy, the real call
rate fell from 1991 until 1998. On the other hand, the real rate of new lend-
ing has not fallen much because of the increasing gap between the new lend-
ing rate and the call rate.
Although the opportunity cost of borrowing for large creditworthy com-
panies is close to the call rate, the cost for small and medium companies is
close to the new lending rate. Therefore, smaller companies have been less
able than larger ones to enjoy the expansionary eﬀect of loose money. This
may have contributed to the relatively weak recovery of the small-business
sector in the 1990s.
It was natural for banks to raise lending rates relative to market rates af-
ter removal of deposit rate controls. However, banks have not succeeded in
obtaining enough of a margin to cover loan losses in a weak economy. At
the same time, smaller borrowers have suﬀered from higher borrowing
costs relative to large companies that have access to capital markets.
1.3.2 Government Financial Institutions
In Japanese ﬁnancial markets, the presence of GFIs is extremely large.
Table 1.7 shows the market share of private banks and GFIs at the end of
2000.
In the loan market, the GFI share reaches 30 percent to 40 percent in ru-
ral prefectures, although it is only 26 percent overall. GFIs make very long-
term loans at about 2 percent. They are especially dominant in housing
loans, holding more than half the outstanding balance.
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Table 1.7 Size of Government and Private Financial Institutions, 2000
Assets
As ¥ Trillions As % of GDP Market Share (%)
Loans
Government 163 32 26
Private banks 464 90 74
Total 627 122 —
Deposits
Postal Savings System 255 50 34
Private banks 486 95 66
Total 741 144 —
Life Insurance
Postal Life 119 23 40
Private Insurers 180 35 60
Total 299 58 —
Source: Computed by the author from calendar year-end data in BOJ (2001).Table 1.8shows the base lending rates of GFIs on 9 February 2001. Their
rates on new lending are similar to those for short-term loans from private
banks, but the average term is much longer.
GFIs obtain subsidies of about ¥1 trillion per year as direct subsidy and
indirect subsidy of zero-cost capital. These are estimated to provide a 60
basis point cost advantage relative to private ﬁnancial institutions. Fur-
ther, they usually accept prepayment without penalties, so their loans are
more attractive to borrowers. As a result, the rates banks can charge are
signiﬁcantly constrained. (See Higo 2001 on the role of GFIs and their in-
stitutional details.)
In the deposit market, the Postal Saving System (PSS) is a dominant
player. Deposits are fully guaranteed by the government. Rates are set
competitively against private deposit-taking institutions. There are more
than 24,000 post oﬃces, giving the system a branch network larger than all
the city and regional banks combined. The largest private banking group,
Mizuho, has only about 600 oﬃces. The PSS does not charge account-
maintenance fees, so it is diﬃcult for private banks to charge such fees
without alienating a large number of customers.
My calculations indicate banks have to raise their lending margin by 80
to 100 basis points to break even in the current economic environment of
deﬂation and recession.
The loan losses in table 1.6 for 1999 and 2000 understate true losses by
some ¥1.5 trillion each year due to underreserving for bad loans. There-
fore, banks lost about ¥3 trillion in each of those years before capital gains.
Macroeconomic conditions deteriorated in 2001, so banks reported more
than ¥9 trillion yen of loan losses in ﬁscal year 2001 alone, partly recog-
nizing the past understated losses.
By raising lending rates 100 basis points, banks can obtain an additional
¥5 trillion from their ¥500 trillion loan portfolio, which would allow them to
write oﬀ bad loans as they surface. However, they can neither raise lending
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Table 1.8 Lending Rates of Government Lending Agencies, 9 February 2001
Basic Loan Rate Average Term
(%) (years)
Japan Development Bank 2.05 16.7
People’s Finance Corp. 2.05 7.3
Japan Finance Corp. for Small Business 2.05 8.9
Japan Finance Corp. for Municipal Enterprises 1.90 n.a.
Housing Loan Corp. 2.70 25.4
Average of all private banks 2.12  1
Fixed rate housing loan from Fuji Bank 4.65 20
Source: JCER (2001b).
Note: All rates are ﬁxed except the average of all private banks. n.a.   not available.rates nor charge higher fees on depositors due to the institutional environ-
ment. If the rate of deﬂation accelerates, banks will run out of capital sooner
or later and the government will be forced to take control of the sector.
1.4 Life Insurance Companies
Private life insurers are the second largest part of the ﬁnancial services
industry after commercial banks, with December 2000 total assets of ¥180
trillion, which is about 35 percent of GDP. Limited competition and the
robust economy allowed life insurance companies to enjoy fairly high
growth and reasonably good proﬁts until the early 1990s. Before the cur-
rent crisis, there were twenty established companies, almost all organized
as mutual companies.
Although the companies are less aﬀected by the bad loan problem than
banks, they face a serious problem. In the late 1980s and early 1990s they
eﬀectively sold massive amounts of what are forward-rate agreement op-
tions. The most important insurance products sold by Japanese companies
in the 1980s and early 1990s were whole-life insurance with term rider and
long-term annuities. Moreover, most of them are sold as monthly payment
plan. These promised high minimum guaranteed returns (yotei riritsu)
over the life of a policy. As a result, life insurance companies eﬀectively
guaranteed high returns on future cash ﬂow. Thus, until 1992, major
Japanese life-insurance companies assumed a return on their assets of 5.5
percent or more in designing policies. In 1992, someone buying even a life
annuity or whole-life insurance was guaranteed 5.5 percent by all the com-
panies.
The proﬁtability of an annuity to its issuer depends on the diﬀerence be-
tween assumed and actual results of three factors: return on invested as-
sets, costs, and death rates. For cautious actuaries, assumed death rates
and operating costs tend to be higher than actual rates. This provides some
cushion for any short-fall in expected investment returns. However, for
many insurers, the shortfalls in asset returns were too big to be covered.
Most companies did not match the terms of their assets and liabilities.
Generally, the term on the asset side has been about ﬁve years, while the av-
erage on the liability side has been ﬁfteen to twenty years. When interest
rates fell sharply in the 1990s, ﬁrms faced massive negative carry. Some
companies were operating with little or no equity by the late 1990s. When
they ﬁnally ﬁled bankruptcy, most were deeply insolvent.
Beginning with the collapse of Nissan Life in April 1997, seven insurers
had failed by mid-2002. Together they left ¥2.68 trillion in negative equity.
This loss has to be born by policyholders and the Policyholder Protection
Fund (PPF) that depends on the contribution by healthier companies.
Table 1.9shows the ﬁnancial conditions of the failed companies. Although
the companies reported fairly high solvency margins just before their fail-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ures, all were found to be insolvent after their bankruptcy. Table 1.10shows
solvency margins. Note that no company has failed since March 2001.
When a life insurance company fails, the court-appointed administrator
cuts the liability of the company so as to make the company viable again.
Most of the liability of an insurance company is policy reserve that corre-
sponds to the accumulated saving of policyholders. Generally speaking,
the surrender value of a policy corresponds to this value. Under the Japan-
ese policyholder protection scheme, the PPF guarantees only 90 percent of
the policy reserve and it does not protect guaranteed minimum returns.
The PPF can also introduce a cancellation penalty on the policy reserve to
reduce the cost of resolution.
As a result, policyholders at bankrupt insurers are hit on three sides. On
average, they have lost about 10 percent of their accrued past saving. Guar-
anteed returns in most cases were cut down to 1 percent to 2 percent. In ad-
dition, heavy early-withdrawal charges are levied on cancellations of poli-
cies of all types. In the case of Chiyoda Life, a policyholder faces a 20
percent charge for immediate cancellation. This charge declines gradually
to two percent in the tenth year. One must wait ten years to cancel without
an early cancellation penalty. Because policyholders can realize the sur-
render value of policies quite easily before a ﬁrm fails, companies thought
to be weak have faced heavy cancellations.
It is usually better for a healthy person to quickly cancel a cash-value life
insurance policy with a failing company and get a new policy elsewhere
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Table 1.10 Solvency Margins of Major Life Insurers
Companya 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Toho 154.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Daihyaku 294.6 304.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chiyoda 314.2 396.1 263.1 n.a. n.a.
Kyoei 300.7 343.2 210.6 n.a. n.a.
Tokyo 431.6 478.7 446.7 n.a. n.a.
Asahi 654.8 688.8 732.7 543.4 417.6
Daido 1016.8 998.0 1004.2 757.6 772.0
Daiichi 632.1 662.1 858.6 682.3 593.0
Fukoku 722.4 820.6 906.5 779.3 708.2
Meiji 719.9 706.1 731.0 667.2 609.4
Mitsui 491.6 519.6 676.7 492.7 510.7
Nippon 939.9 849.9 1095.8 778.1 714.4
Sumitomo 526.2 589.5 675.7 551.3 534.5
Taiyo 873.0 869.1 1050.3 806.8 768.2
Yasuda 648.1 727.2 808.5 602.6 612.8
Notes: The ﬁrst ﬁve are listed in the order in which they went bankrupt. Others are listed al-
phabetically. n.a.   not available.
a”Life” is the second word in the names of all these companies.than to stick to the existing policy. However, getting a new life policy is
more expensive, and perhaps not possible, for an unhealthy person. This
means the burden of an insurer’s failure falls more heavily on those who
have become less insurable.
1.4.1 Weak Supervision
The life insurance industry’s crisis has been exacerbated by the forbear-
ance policy of its supervisory authorities, the former Ministry of Finance
and the FSA. Because of extremely lenient capital requirements and reluc-
tance to close down unhealthy ﬁrms, most failed life insurance companies
had large negative equity by the time of their formal failure.
The regulatory measure of capital requirements in insurance is the sol-
vency margin, which relates net assets to estimated risk. The net assets are
capital   risk reserves   general loan loss reserves   excess reserves over
surrender value of policies   future proﬁts   tax eﬀect   subordinated
debt. The estimated risk equals ([insurance risk]2   [interest rate risk   as-
set value risk]2)1/2   management risk. The net assets are divided by the es-
timated risk and multiplied by 200 to obtain the solvency margin. The min-
imum ratio for sound companies is 200. Below that, regulators are required
to take corrective action.
The requirement was imported from the United States, but Japanese reg-
ulators have made a number of modiﬁcations that weaken the rule consid-
erably, including setting the trigger levels for prompt corrective action
much lower. Table 1.11 illustrates the major diﬀerences.
For a number of reasons the numerator in Japan is overstated. Especially
worrisome is inclusion of a large deferred tax asset and future proﬁts.
Moreover, Japan generously includes assets with no liquidation value, al-
though the U.S. standard excludes them. Regarding the denominator side,
Japanese risk weights are considerably lower than those of the United
States. Thus, for publicly traded corporate equity (stock), the risk weight is
about one-third the U.S. level. For real estate and foreign currency assets,
the risk weights are one-half the U.S. levels.
The Financial Studies Group of the JCER, which I head, have tried to
adjust for the diﬀerences in the solvency margin requirements in Japan and
the United States. The quality of disclosure by life insurance companies
has improved considerably since the mid-1990s, so we can do this from
publicly available data. Figure 1.6 shows the results for the end of March
2000.
Based on what they disclose, all the major companies are above the 200
percent level, implying that they are all healthy. We have made three types
of adjustments. The ﬁrst uses U.S. risk weights and adjusts for unrealized
capital gains and losses, but allows inclusion of assets with no liquidation
value. With these adjustments, two companies are deemed insolvent.
The second is closer to—but still somewhat less stringent than—the U.S.
28 Mitsuhiro Fukaostandard. Speciﬁcally, we removed assets with no liquidation value. Three
companies are insolvent under this deﬁnition.
The third approach involves removing subordinated debt from the capi-
tal base because its quality as capital is less than that of retained earnings
and surplus notes (which are similar to the nonvoting redeemable preferred
shares of joint stock companies). Under this measure, four companies were
insolvent even when the Nikkei 225 was at 20,337, signiﬁcantly higher than
it is two years later as this is written.
Three companies that had negative adjusted solvency margins failed
within a year: Chiyoda Life and Kyoei Life ﬁled bankruptcy in October
2000, as did Tokyo Life in March 2001. The fourth company, Nichidan
Life, received a capital injection from Axa, a French insurance company.
Figure 1.7 shows the same picture for March 2002. The disclosed ratios
are more than 500 percent except for one company. However, “Adjusted 2”
indicates that the FSA should intervene in at least three weaker companies:
Mitsui, Asahi, and Sumitomo Life. The Nikkei was 11,025 at that time. We
estimated that a 20 percent fall in the index would pull the solvency mar-
gin of weaker companies down by about 100 points. Therefore, a Nikkei
below 10,000 means three companies probably are critically undercapital-
Financial Sector Proﬁtability and Double-Gearing 29
Table 1.11 Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Capital Requirements for Life
Insurance Companies
Japanese Solvency 
U.S. RBC regulation Margin Regulation
Assets of no liquidation value 
in the net asset calculation
Deferred tax asset Not allowed Allowed
Movable property Not allowed Allowed
Future proﬁt Not allowed One-year proﬁt until March 
2000; half-year proﬁt is allowed 
since then
Unrealized losses
In domestic bonds Deducted from asset Not deducted from assets until 
March 2001
In foreign securities Deducted from asset Not deducted from assets until 
March 2001
Weights for market risk
Stocks 22.5–45% 10%
Foreign bonds 10% 5%
Real estates 10% 5%
Trigger levels for the initiation 
of prompt corrective actions
No action More than 250% More than 200%
Submit plans for improvements 150–250% 100–200%
Stronger intervention 70–150% 0–100%
Authority takes over the control Less than 70% Less than 0%Fig. 1.6 Adjusted solvency margin ratios, March 2000
Source: JCER (2000).ized and three others would require prompt corrective actions under U.S.
standards.
1.5 Increasing Double-Gearing
All the major life insurance companies are mutual companies, so there
is no formal cross-holding of shares. However, the insurers are major
shareholders of the banks—collectively owning 10 percent or more of each
city bank during the 1990s. Moreover, banks and life insurers have relied
on each other to raise broadly deﬁned capital. Between March 2000 and
March 2001 the bankruptcies of Chiyoda, Kyoei, and Tokyo Life reduced
the double-gearing, but it is still signiﬁcant. At the end of March 2001,
seven life insurance companies collectively held ¥5.4 trillion of bank stocks
and ¥5.1 trillion of bank subordinated debts. In exchange, banks hold ¥1
trillion of surplus notes and ¥1.2 trillion of subordinated debts of seven life
insurance companies.
The double-gearing generates two important problems: poor-quality
capital in Japan’s ﬁnancial sector, which increases systemic risk, and a
weaker governance structure of banks.
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Fig. 1.7 Adjusted solvency margin ratios, March 2002
Source: JCER (2002).As regards systemic risk, suppose a major life insurer ﬁled for bank-
ruptcy. The banks that hold the company’s subordinated loans and surplus
notes lose money. The price of the stock of these banks falls to reﬂect the
write-oﬀs, which reduces the assets of insurance companies holding bank
stocks. It may even trigger a chain reaction of failures among Japanese ﬁ-
nancial institutions.
The corporate governance structure of Japan’s major life insurance com-
panies is weak. The representative policyholder meeting plays the role a
shareholder meeting does for joint stock companies. Each representative
policyholder has one vote. They are inevitably chosen by management.
Sometimes, they become policyholders only after being asked to be a rep-
resentative policyholder. In other cases, a manager of a company that bor-
rows from the insurance company is asked.1
1.6 Conclusion
Stock prices of listed Japanese banks have been very weak since the end
of 2001. I believe that this reﬂects a number of remaining problems in Japan’s
ﬁnancial system. First, proﬁt margins are too small to cover the increased
default risk since the bubble burst more than ten years ago. Many ﬁrms have
not overcome their debt overhang and are surviving on the indulgence of
their banks. Banks have not succeeded in increasing their lending margins
because of strong competitive pressure from government-backed ﬁnancial
institutions. They also are facing strong political pressure to lend to small
and medium ﬁrms regardless of merit. More broadly, revisions to the bank-
ing law require regulatory approval of new investors, and a condition of ap-
proval is that they “fully understand a bank’s social responsibilities.”
Second, there is massive double-gearing between life insurance compa-
nies and banks. Systemic risk remains very high. Financial sector problems
can be stabilized by public money; either by injecting capital into the banks
or by extending a full government guarantee of deposits, the government
can stabilize the fragile ﬁnancial system. However, a far larger problem will
surface in that event: the critical situation of the national debt. Because of
deﬂation and high real interest rates, the Japanese economy is shrinking.
Nominal GDP declined 2 percent in 2001 and such negative growth is
likely to continue unless there are very strong policy actions.
Table 1.12shows a simple projection of Japan’s budgetary situations un-
der –2 percent nominal growth and an unchanged primary deﬁcit of 6 per-
cent of GDP. I did not take account of the cost of stabilizing the ﬁnancial
system, but I did assume a massive cutting of government expenditures in
line with declining tax revenue. The gross debt of the general government
will exceed 200 percent of GDP by 2008.
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.If the government cannot stabilize the macro-economy by stopping de-
ﬂation, I expect Japanese yen government bonds (JGB) to be downgraded
to speculative by 2007. (In July 2002 they had the lowest rating among
major countries: AA– by Standard & Poor’s and A2 by Moody’s.) If down-
graded further, the government will have to shift to short-term notes to re-
duce interest costs. However, shortening maturity will increase vulnerabil-
ity to a sharp rise in interest rates.
A junk bond status of JGB will generate enormous problems for the cor-
porate sector. Sovereign credit usually sets a ceiling for private companies.
Japanese banks will not be able to use JGBs as collateral in dealing with
foreign banks. Moody’s downgraded the major banks’ ﬁnancial strength to
its lowest ratings on 2 July 2002. Japanese savers are shifting assets from
yen deposits to foreign currency deposits and gold. The relative weakness
of the yen in the face of rapidly declining dollar interest rates in 2001 may
have indicated a mild form of capital ﬂight.
Massive capital ﬂight will cure Japan’s deﬂation by sharply devaluing the
yen. However, other Asian countries will devalue against the dollar to re-
main competitive. That will export deﬂation to the rest of the world, in-
cluding the United States. In that event, the United States may have to fol-
low the Japanese example of a zero interest rate policy.
The end of deﬂation may trigger a budgetary crisis in Japan. Suppose
Japan has 200 percent gross debt, mostly ﬁnanced by short-term liabilities.
Most of its foreign assets are long-term and at ﬁxed interest rates, so the
government cannot count on a higher interest income in the short run un-
der increasing interest rates. A 500 basis point rise in interest rates (which
would make rates about the same as they were in 1991) will increase interest
payments to 10 percent of GDP, ¥50 trillion. This is about the same as total
national government tax revenue excluding social security contributions.
Many Japanese policymakers and corporate leaders have spent more
than ten years assuming time will solve whatever the problems are with less
pain and cost than will aggressive confrontation. Time not only has not
solved the problems, it has made many of them worse. I would like to say
the scenarios I have depicted are pessimistic assessments, but sadly they
are all too possible. The pain and the cost will continue to grow, as the
economy stagnates, unless a more immediate, comprehensive, and aggres-
sive attack is made on the known problems.
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